Is a Coherent Theory of Religious Freedom Possible? by Smith, Steven D.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1998
Is a Coherent Theory of Religious Freedom
Possible?
Steven D. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Smith, Steven D., "Is a Coherent Theory of Religious Freedom Possible?" (1998). Constitutional Commentary. 1040.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1040
IS A COHERENT THEORY OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM POSSIBLE? 
Steven D. Smith· 
Is a theory of religious freedom possible? It's obvious that 
we can and do talk about and argue about issues of religious 
freedom-school prayer, aid to parochial schools, and so forth. 
But a "theory" entails something more than "talk," or ad hoc 
argumentation. 1 More specifically, we would treat talk as falling 
short of being a "theory of religious freedom" on either of two 
grounds that are relevant here. 
First, we sometimes distinguish between a "theory" and 
something else that we might describe as a compromise or 
"modus vivendi." A modus vivendi doesn't give us an internally 
consistent set of principles capable of generating answers to 
questions of religious freedom; it is more in the nature of a ne-
gotiated, and perhaps messy, truce. 
Second, a position does not qualify as a theory of religious 
freedom if it begins by preferring one (or some subset) of the 
competing religious and secular positions, and then proceeds to 
spell out what that preferred position does and doesn't allow. 
Suppose I contend, for example, that the law should permit 
teacher-led school prayer but not compulsory baptism; and 
when asked to explain these conclusions I argue that they follow 
from the best interpretation of Catholic theology, or perhaps 
Mormon or Muslim theology, and that this particular theology is 
the truest or best one available. I think we do not consider this 
sort of position to be a theory of religious freedom. On the con-
trary, this sort of position is as a historical matter entirely fa-
miliar, and it is just what religious freedom is supposed to save 
us from. 
• Byron White Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado. Pre-
sented at the AALS Law & Religion panel, Washington D.C., January 6, 1997. 
1. Thus, I don't think arguments that certain arrangements regarding religion are 
better or worse than other arrangements necessarily implies that a theory of religious 
freedom does or must exist, as some scholars suggest. See Christopher L. Eisgruber and 
Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 577, 591-92 (1996). 
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I. WHY THERE CAN BE NO THEORY OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 
My view is that all argumentation about religious freedom 
will be disqualified from being a "theory of religious freedom" 
on one or the other of these grounds.2 It may be helpful if I give 
the reason for my view in summary form, and then elaborate. 
I think the establishment and free exercise controversies 
that we are familiar with present one aspect of a more universal 
problem, which we might call the problem of "the spiritual and 
the temporal. "3 "For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the 
Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the 
other .... "4 The enduring problem is to determine how these 
matters stand in relation to each other. Does the spiritual take 
priority over the temporal, or vice versa? Is the spiritual more 
real, or more authoritative, than the temporal-earth being 
merely a footstool for heaven? Or, conversely, is the spiritual 
merely derivative, or epiphenomenal, or perhaps merely a delu-
sion? 
Problems of religious freedom present one manifestation of 
this conflict within the realm of politics and law. These prob-
lems may involve competing claims to authority advanced by 
spiritual and temporal institutions. Or they may involve spiri-
tual claims made by individuals that conflict with more general 
temporal interests. And when such spiritual-temporal conflicts 
arise, possible responses or resolutions can be understood as 
falling into three general categories, which I will describe as 
"spiritual primacy," "temporal primacy," and "dualism." The 
first two categories offer the possibility (at least in the abstract) 
of "theory," or of principled resolutions of conflicts-but not of 
resolutions that can usefully be described as respecting 
"religious freedom." The last category-dualism-is capable of 
recognizing a place for religious freedom, but it does not offer 
the possibility of principled resolutions of conflicts. 
2. For a lengthier and somewhat differently structured argument for this conclu-
sion, and one that considers "originalist" as well as "nonoriginalist" arguments, see Ste-
ven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious 
Freedom (Oxford U. Press, 1995). 
3. Different people would use different vocabularies, of course; they might distin-
guish between the soul with its goods and the body with its appetites, or between nature 
and grace, or between our welfare in this life and in the next. 
4. Galatians 5:17. 
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A. THE PRIMACY OF THE SPIRITUAL 
I want to try to clarify these general observations by con-
sidering a concrete example of each of these responses. So let 
me start with the category of "spiritual primacy." In this view, 
the temporal is subordinate to, or perhaps a subset of, the spiri-
tual. And it seems to follow that spiritual-temporal conflicts 
should be resolved by applying spiritual criteria. 
As an example of this approach, consider the medieval pa-
pacy's conception of government and law, as interpreted by 
Walter Ullmann.5 Ullmann explains that 
the papacy, in common with medieval doctrine and literature, 
held that the individual's activities cannot be separated into 
more or less well defined categories .... Christianity seized 
the whole of man-man was whole and indivisible: every one 
of his actions was thought to have been accessible to the 
judgement by Christian norms and standards.6 
Those Christian norms and standards were ultimately di-
rected toward a spiritual and indeed otherwordly end: the salva-
tion of the soul. But it did not follow that the affairs of this life 
were unimportant. On the contrary, "while the end of this 
[Christian] society and of its members was in the other world, 
the terrestrial life was nonetheless of fundamental importance in 
achieving this other-worldly aim, that is, salvation. The princi-
ple of indivisibility embraced the life in this as well as in the 
other world .... "7 
Within this spiritual conception of life, the Church was re-
sponsible for administering the Christian norms that governed 
all earthly activities.8 Consequently, the papacy regarded the 
5. I should say that although Ullmann's depiction, like all historical interpreta-
tions, is debatable; I'm using it here not so much to make historical claims as to illustrate 
one possible approach to our problem. 
6. Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages 33 
(Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1961). 
7. ld. at 34. 
However much a thing may be purely "temporal" it nevertheless had to serve a 
Christian end, because in papal doctrine the "temporal" had no indigenous 
value, had no autonomous standing, but was simply a means to an end .... The 
"temporal" ... had no value in itself but assumed value if it was harnessed to 
the purpose and end of the Christian's life and consequently of Christian soci-
ety. 
Id. at 73. 
8. Precisely because this Church was an entity that existed on this earth its 
direction concerned therefore the doings of its members on this earth. The vi-
tal point was that these earthly activities of the Christians must be directed by 
Christian norms, which meant that they must be guided, orientated, directed. 
Id. at 35. 
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Church and the pope as possessing jurisdiction to direct all the 
affairs of Christendom. Within this comprehensive jurisdiction, 
Ullmann argues, all other authorities (including both bishops 
and princes) were subordinate to papal authority. "Power, that 
is, jurisdiction, was concentrated in the pope, who handed part 
of it on to the bishops, part of it to kings and emperors, and so 
forth."9 In sum, "the secular prince ... [was] a necessary, auxil-
iary organ ... instituted by divinity to assist the pope in his gov-
ernment."10 
This conception provided an intellectual framework within 
which conflicts between religious and secular authorities could 
be adjudicated.11 To use our terms, that framework allowed for 
a "theory," I think, because it contained inclusive principles that 
were accepted by the competing interests as those interests were 
understood at the time. Of course, kings and emperors often re-
sisted the popes' claims, and in the realm of power and politics 
their resistance was often successful. But in the realm of theory 
the secular rulers were severely handicapped because they 
themselves embraced the inclusive premises on which the papal 
claims rested. 
Thus, Ullmann explains that "it would be wholly erroneous 
to think that these principles were, so to speak, imposed upon 
kings and princes."1 
No king or emperor ever objected to the papal theme that his 
kingdom was entrusted to him by God: on the contrary, it was 
the kings themselves who, quite independent of, and uninflu-
enced by, the papacy had adopted this standpoint.13 
Of course, a king could claim that he received his power 
from God directly, rather through the intermediary of the pope. 
The emperor Henry IV made just this claim in his famous dis-
pute with Pope Gregory VII. But in an officially Christian 
world this assertion seemed weak. The New Testament re-
9. Id. at 55. In this allocation of powers, the specific function of the secular prince 
was the suppression of evil, including heresy, by force. Id. at 64-66,79-82. It was for the 
Church to judge what was evil-full authority or sovereignty lay only with the pope, id. 
at 67, 72, fr7 -and for the prince to act upon and enforce that judgment. 
10. Id. at 65. 
11. It meant that each office-holder should fulfil the functions contained in his 
office, and no more. The king should not interfere in the functions of the 
bishop, because he was not created for this purpose; the archdeacon should not 
meddle with matters pertaining to the sheriff, and so forth. 
Id. at 67. 
12. ld. at 88. 
13. Id. at 61. 
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corded Christ's conferral of power on Peter-and, by inference, 
on his successors-but what evidence was there of any inde-
pendent divine conferral of authority on the king or the em-
peror? And what special competence could a worldly and per-
haps illiterate prince claim in matters of scripture and Christian 
doctrine? Ullmann stresses that within the Christocentric 
worldview, papal claims to sovereignty were perfectly logical-
indeed, virtually irrefutable. We might put the point more gen-
erally: If the primacy of a spiritual position is accepted within a 
community, then it is natural that the office or institution re-
sponsible for preserving and interpreting that spiritual position 
should enjoy ultimate authority within the community. 
Consequently, the possibility of a secular authority inde-
pendent of the Church awaited the emergence of a dualistic 
worldview in which the "temporal" was freed from its subordi-
nation to the "spiritual." Opponents of papal authority tried to 
develop this position. Ullmann explains: "What the dualists 
aimed at in their opposition to the papacy was the ascription of 
autonomous and indigenous character to the 'temporal' .... In 
this way it was believed that the monarchy of the king could be 
saved: in temporal matters the king was to be the monarch, in 
spiritual matters the pope."14 
This dualist talk begins to sound familiar to modem ears 
accustomed to the theme of "separation of church and state." 
But in the medieval climate of opinion the dualist view made lit-
tle headway for the understandable reason that the spiritual and 
the temporal did not seem severable. Dualism, Ullmann ex-
plains, "contradicted not only the Pauline doctrine, which the 
papacy had made its own, but also the principle of totality or in-
divisibility, which in itself was the message of Christianity, seiz-
ing as it did the whole of man and the whole of his activities 
without splitting them up into different compartments. "15 
In sum, in a world in which competing parties concurred in 
accepting a set of premises that treated the temporal as subordi-
nate to the spiritual, it was possible to develop a theory regulat-
ing the relations between, to use our terms, church and state. 
And this theory could contemplate-indeed, insist upon-a divi-
sion of functions between "secular" officials such as kings and 
religious officials such as bishops. Still, it would seem a little 
14. Id. at 97. "[D]ualism of government was to be the panacea of royal govern-
ments from Henry IV in the Investiture Contest, who actually coined the term and in-
vented the idea, down to the Reformers and beyond." I d. 
15. Id. 
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strange to describe this theory as a theory of religious freedom. 
The label seems inappropriate not because the theory allowed 
secular authorities no freedom-in fact the popes never tried to 
dictate every decision made by kings and emperors-but be-
cause a system under which secular authorities are auxiliaries to 
the Church and have just as much power as the Church assigns 
to them is not the sort of arrangement we have in mind when we 
talk about "religious freedom." On the contrary, we would call 
such a system a "theocracy." And we are accustomed to treat-
ing "theocracy" not as a version of, but rather as the antithesis 
of, "religious freedom." 
B. THE PRIMACY OF THE TEMPORAL 
I've been describing the medieval papacy's conception of 
government, as depicted by Ullmann, as an example of a system 
that gives priority to the spiritual. What might be an example of 
the opposite position-that is, of a system that treats the spiri-
tual as subordinate to or a subdivision of the temporal? You 
might suspect that the answer is very close at hand-that as legal 
scholars we actually inhabit just such a system. Maybe so, but to 
avoid controversial characterizations, let me adopt the law 
teacher's trick of describing a partly hypothetical culture that 
will illustrate my point-one that you can recognize or not as 
you choose. 
Imagine then a community in which most people ultimately 
believe in and care only for the temporal. They believe, per-
haps, that this life is all we have: "When we die, we die." This 
community also believes that there is no guiding intelligence or 
overall purpose or design in the cosmos. So the purpose of peo-
ple-and hence of governments established of, by, and for the 
people-is to promote the welfare of human beings in this life. 
The community and most of its members are committed solely 
to the pursuit of temporal values and interests. Of course, this 
community might still care about "spiritual" things in a watered 
down sense of the word-it might use the adjective to describe 
things like opera and poetry, for example-but it has rejected 
religious entities or notions such as God, the soul, grace, the su-
pernatural, and life after death. 
But lest we solve the problem of religious freedom too 
quickly simply by eliminating religion, we can suppose that a re-
sidual commitment to the spiritual lingers on in several ways. 
First, a few members of the community retain a genuine faith in 
1998] THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 79 
God, the soul, life after death, and the divine authorship of 
scripture. These religious believers are widely regarded as pe-
culiar and backward, and at least among the more educated, 
their faith is viewed as "irrational superstitious nonsense. "16 
Even so, they are capable of causing unpleasantness. Moreover, 
in view of the community's egalitarian pretensions these relig-
ionists are thought to be entitled in some ill-defined sense to 
"equal concern and respect." 
In addition, some members of the community who do not 
actually believe in God or the soul still feel a degree of selective 
affection toward religious practices and traditions. They may 
think some traditions are useful in the upbringing of children. 
They expect that as adults these erstwhile children will come to 
understand the purely pragmatic function of the traditions-
while of course continuing to pass on the traditions to their own 
children. Others may find religious practices soothing 
(Gregorian chants, maybe), or aesthetically attractive, or useful 
on special occasions for expressing emotions like hope or grief. 
There are also agnostics of an antiquarian bent who find that re-
ligious traditions and rituals help them to preserve ties to the 
past, and perhaps to maintain a sense of personal or communal 
identity. 
In short, "religion" continues to exist in various senses even 
in this devoutly temporal community. But would there be any 
room, or any reason, to give special honor or legal status to re-
ligious freedom? Of course, the community might recognize 
and in a sense respect practices that for some purposes are clas-
sified under the heading of "religion." The community might 
protect these practices, that is, because they implicate temporal 
interests. If government interferes with religious belief or exer-
cise, the interference might injure people's peace of mind or 
sense of identity. Frustrated religionists might become uncivil 
or even violent. For reasons like these, the community might 
conceivably carve out an area of human activity called 
"religion" and afford it different or special legal treatment. And 
it's even conceivable, if unlikely, that this special treatment 
could be successfully codified in terms of some principle or the-
ory. People who advocated such a position might claim that 
they had articulated a theory of religious freedom. 
16. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Outlaw Blues, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1418, 1427 (1989) 
(asserting that "such things as divine revelation and biblical literalism are irrational su-
perstitious nonsense"). 
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Still, there are good reasons to question both this possibility 
and this characterization. Notice first that although the hypo-
thetical position could be called a "theory of religious freedom," 
it does not offer any protection to religion as religion, or because 
of its character as religion. Rather, the theory protects religion 
as temporal human activity and because that activity is thought 
to affect temporal interests. To put the point differently, from 
the community's standpoint, it is in a sense merely fortuitous that 
the activities and beliefs which affect the temporal interests in 
question happen to be religious activities and beliefs. So we 
might doubt that it is helpful, or accurate, to attach the label of 
"theory of religious freedom" to an account that does not even 
count the religious character of a belief or activity as relevant in 
itself or for its own sake. 
This question about truth-in-labeling points to a related 
practical objection: The temporal interests invoked by the the-
ory will probably not correlate cleanly with "religious" activities 
and beliefs, and so it will seem both illogical and imprudent to 
make the theory's application coextensive with what is for other 
purposes called "religion." Suppose, for example, that a theory 
is based on the value of self-realization. It holds, perhaps, that 
government should not interfere in religious choices because 
these choices are too closely linked to a person's sense of who 
she is, or to her very identity; and self-definition or self-
realization are temporal interests that the community should re-
spect.17 The point about labeling suggests that it would be more 
accurate to call this a "theory of self-realization," not a "theory 
of religious freedom." The related practical point is that self-
realization probably does not correlate precisely, or even very 
closely, with religion. For many people, choices that are not re-
ligious may be central to self-realization, while choices that in-
volve religion may not always affect self-realization in any es-
sential way. So the logic of the theory suggests that it should 
abandon its claim to being a theory of reli§ious freedom not 
only in name but also in practical application. 
17. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment 
Clause, 82 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1113 (1988). 
18. The draft exemption cases illustrate this progression. They started with statu-
tory language that plainly exempted only persons whose objection to war arose from a 
set of beliefs centered on faith in a "Supreme Being" -i.e. God. But in the modem cli-
mate of legal opinion this sort of focus seemed incongruous or unacceptable. Hence, the 
cases first expanded the definition of what would count as a religious objection and then 
made it clear that the expanded definition would apply even to a belief that the consci-
entious objector himself did not regard as a religious belief. Justice Harlan went even 
further, explicitly asserting that the availability of the exemption could not depend on 
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One response to this objection might argue that although 
"religion" is not identical to temporal interests like personal 
autonomy, still for practical purposes religion is a good proxy 
for those interests. But this argument seems dubious at best. 
Particularly in a pluralistic culture where "religion" takes a vari-
ety of radically diverse forms, it seems prima facie implausible 
that the amorphous category of "religion" would correlate even 
approximately with any particular temporal interest or set of in-
terests. 
In this situation, how would we account for continuing ef-
forts to theorize about religious freedom? If a given community 
already has a longstanding commitment to religious freedom de-
rived from earlier events and other grounds (perhaps by now 
largely forgotten), then it would be tempting to interpret tempo-
ral arguments for religious freedom as post hoc and less than 
persuasive rationalizations for a commitment that the commu-
nity has inherited but no longer fully grasps. And a prescription 
that might naturally follow from this interpretation is that the 
community should clean up its theory and practice in light of its 
current beliefs and values. One way to do this would be to dis-
solve religious freedom into other, more current theories and 
commitments-commitments to free speech/9 perhaps, or to 
equality.20 
In this way the community conceivably might bring its prac-
tice into line with what is for it a plausible theory or set of prin-
ciples. And under other headings, like "free speech" or 
"equality," the community might continue to give legal protec-
tion to some beliefs and practices that the believers and practi-
tioners themselves regard as "religion. "21 But the purified tem-
poral community would not now claim to have, or to operate 
according to, any "theory of religious freedom." 
religion per se at all, but would have to be tailored to something else, such as a sincere 
moral objection to war. 
19. William Marshall is a prominent religion clause scholar who takes this course. 
See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J. Contemp. Le-
gal Issues 385 (1996); William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Ex-
ercise as Expression, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 545 (1983). 
20. Leading constitutional scholars who take this approach include Lawrence 
Sager and Christopher Eisgruber, see, e.g., Sager and Eisgruber, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 577 
(cited in note 1), and Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality, and Speech in 
the U.S. Constitution, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 739 (1986). 
21. I have discussed these "reductionist" approaches to religious freedom at 
greater length in Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitu-
tional Discourse,140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, 196-223,239-40 (1991). 
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C. DUALISM 
The positions I've talked about thus far have been monistic 
in the sense that they have regarded either the spiritual or the 
temporal as primary and encompassing, with the subordinate 
term being viewed as a subdivision of the primary or preferred 
category. I have argued that at least in the abstract both per-
spectives offer the possibility of "theory" prescribing principled 
resolutions for some of the disputes that we treat under the 
headings of "religious freedom," or "church and state"; but nei-
ther perspective actually recognizes the value of "religious free-
dom" in a meaningful sense. 
That value is associated, rather, with a dualist position-
one that regards both the spiritual and the temporal as inde-
pendently valuable. This sort of perspective, with both its 
promises and problems, is reflected in John Locke's "A Letter 
Concerning Toleration." Locke acknowledges the importance 
both of spiritual interests-the salvation of the soul-and of 
temporal or "civil interests," or "things belonging to this life," 
such as "life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the pos-
session of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furni-
ture, and the like. "22 And spiritual and temporal values are in-
dependent of each other; property, for example, is a good not 
because it will contribute to our eternal salvation, but because it 
is valuable in the here and now. 
Based on this dualistic view, Locke argues for a division of 
responsibility between the church and the state. The church's 
function is to care for the salvation of souls, and in such matters 
of salvation the state has no legitimate concern. The state's 
function, rather, is to protect and promote the civil interests. In 
this way, Locke concludes that church and commonwealth are 
"perfectly distinct, and infinitely different from each other" and 
that '1t]he boundaries on both sides are fixed and immove-
able." 
Of course, dualistic thinking and imagery have pervaded 
discussions of religious freedom in this country. The notion sur-
faces again and again: Church is church and state is state; they 
are separated by a high and impregnable wall, and both are hap-
pier for the split. The dualist view is attractive because it seems 
22. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in John Locke on Politics and 
Education 21,25 (Classics Club, 1947). 
23. I d. at 35. 
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to recognize the value of religious freedom in a more meaning-
ful sense than do either of the more monistic views. 
In addition, presentations like Locke's even seem at first to 
allow for a theory of religious freedom. The task of theory is to 
determine which interests belong to the spiritual domain and 
which belong to the temporal, and in this way to draw a line of 
demarcation between the spheres. Once that line has been 
fixed, then when questions of religious freedom arise we need 
only examine the interests closely to see which side of the line 
they fall on. 
Upon closer examination, though, the pleasant prospects 
offered by the dualist view dissolve. One way to consider the 
problem is to ask from whose perspective it can be said that the 
church's concern is solely for the salvation of souls, while the 
state's responsibility is for this-worldly, "civil" interests. If this 
is the way the church itself and the state itself understand their 
respective domains, then a nice harmony of interests seems pos-
sible. Indeed, it becomes difficult to explain why religious free-
dom and church-state relations ever created such a ruckus in the 
first place. On the other hand, if the church or the state do not 
understand their roles in this way, so that Locke's description of 
roles is merely his own (or perhaps the state's, or the church's) 
view of what the division of responsibilities ought to be, then no 
principled resolution has been achieved. Instead, the pretense 
of such a resolution is in reality merely the imposition of terms 
by a dominant party employing a deceitful description of what 
the other party cares about. 
In fact, churches historically have not understood their con-
cern to be limited to the salvation of souls in the next life.24 
Later in his essay, Locke acknowledges that both religion and 
the state are vitally concerned with issues of morality.25 The 
concession effectively negates his earlier claim that the spiritual 
and temporal spheres are "perfectly distinct and infinitely dif-
ferent from each other" -a claim which is essential to the possi-
bility of a dualistic or separation principle. 
A different way of highlighting the false promise of dualism 
is to ask whether the different interests of the spiritual and the 
24. For example, many churches have regarded the achievement of education, so· 
~ial justice, and civil rights as major religious objectives. Even more importantly, relig· 
Ions rarely separate the concerns of this life from those of the next; they have typically 
taught that the way a person lives here will powerfully affect the disposition of the soul 
after death. 
25. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration at 52· 53 (cited in note 22). 
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temporal are wholly different, or whether their respective 
spheres of interest are different but overlapping, as in a Venn 
diagram. If the spheres of interest were wholly different, then a 
principled resolution of conflicts should be easily attainable; in-
deed, the harder problem once again would be to explain why 
such conflicts ever arise in the first place. But if the spheres 
overlap (as they almost certainly do), then it is natural to sup-
pose that conflicts, and hence questions of religious freedom, 
will arise within the area of overlap. And within that area, the 
dualist promise of a principled resolution cannot be fulfilled. 
Since both the spiritual and the temporal make a claim, any so-
lution will necessarily reject one of those claims by giving pri-
macy to the competing perspective. 
And precisely because it recognizes that the spiritual and 
the temporal are both valuable, and that they are independently 
valuable (as opposed to one being derived from or a subset of 
the other), dualism cannot dictate which perspective should pre-
vail. If the spiritual and the temporal are both real and autono-
mous, in other words, then there is no more encompassing prin-
ciple to which they are both subordinate. 
Any actual controversy involving religious freedom can 
serve to illustrate this controversy. Suppose that Native Ameri-
cans assert a religious duty to use peyote in religious rituals, 
while a state insists on banning the use of harmful drugs, which 
in the state's view include peyote. The use of peyote in this con-
text affects both a spiritual interest and a temporal interest. A 
dualist view would observe that both interests are independently 
valuable; neither is simply derivative of or reducible into the 
other. And the response to this dualist observation is, "Yes. 
That's exactly why we have a conflict." In this context the spiri-
tual and temporal domains overlap, and in order to resolve the 
conflict, someone will have to treat either the spiritual or the 
temporal as primary and the other interest as subordinate. 
This objection does not imply that the dualist view is wrong, 
I think, or that the dualist view cannot value religious freedom. 
The point is merely that dualism itself cannot provide any the-
ory or principle defining the proper scope of religious freedom.26 
On the contrary, the occurrence of actual controversies demon-
strates that a point has been reached where the contribution of 
26. Does the absence of a "principle" mean that judicial review in this area would 
necessarily be "unprincipled" and therefore illegitimate? For a tentative discussion, see 
Steven D. Smith, Unprincipled Religious Freedom, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 497 
(1996). 
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dualism is insufficient to produce peace. At that point a deci-
sion-maker will be forced to give priority to either the spiritual 
or the temporal perspective, and we will once again be faced 
with the same problems that afflict the monistic positions. 
II. THE INNUMERABLE CITIES 
The moral of this story is that our concept of religious free-
dom gets its meaning within a dualist framework. But a dualist 
framework cannot honestly offer any useful principle, or support 
any theory, for adjudicating the problems we consider under the 
heading of religious freedom. So to the extent that religious 
freedom flourishes within a dualist system, it will necessarily re-
flect an accommodation or a modus vivendi among spiritual or 
temporal interests, not a deduction from theory or principle. 
This conclusion should not be surprising. On a personal 
level, most of us are quite accustomed to negotiating between 
the spiritual and the temporal. True saints (if there are any) or 
true atheists (if there are any) may manage to achieve monistic 
peace. Meanwhile, most of us try to serve both masters, and so 
we live in tension, making choices that are at times arbitrary, in-
tuitive, ad hoc, not regulated by any encompassing principle or 
theory. We might say that we "balance" the spiritual and the 
temporal, except that the metaphor of balancing suggests more 
precision than we really experience. It might be more accurate 
to say that we "juggle" the spiritual and the temporal, acknowl-
edging that many of us are clumsy jugglers who are often forced 
to stoop and pick up the pieces. As we've been told, the 
"double-minded man is unstable in all his ways."27 
On a more global level, the moral of the discussion is also a 
familiar one-famously presented in, for example, Augustine's 
City of God. Religious believers are citizens of two cities, 
Augustine explained-an earthly city and a heavenly one. Both 
cities seek "peace." This apparently common goal might make 
it seem that the cities are nicely harmonious; and indeed a lim-
ited harmony may be achievable.28 But in fact by "peace" the 
two cities understand quite different things. "The earthly city, 
which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and the end 
it proposes ... is the combination of men's wills to attain the 
27. James 1:8. 
28. "[A)s this life is common to both cities, so there is a harmony between them in 
regard to what belongs to it." Saint Augustine, City of God 19:17 (Marcus Dods, trans. 
& ed., Hafner Publishing Co., 1948). 
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things which are helpful to this life."29 The heavenly city takes 
advantage of this peace, but it also understands that "the per-
fectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one 
another in God" is what "alone can be truly called and esteemed 
the peace of the reasonable creatures .... "30 These different 
conceptions and different ultimate attachments and aspirations 
sometimes come into conflict, and when that happens "the 
heavenly city has been compelled ... to dissent, and to become 
obnoxious to those who think differently."31 
In the final analysis, therefore, the heavenly city "lives like 
a captive and a stranger in the earthly city."32 The heavenly city 
can seek benign terms of captivity, or perhaps a sort of truce, 
from the earthly sovereign; it cannot hope for genuine under-
standing and union. 
Augustine's analysis remains valid for our modern society, I 
think, except that our more developed pluralism-in the realms 
both of religion and of government-may make the description 
of two cities seem a little quaint. For us, it seems, there are not 
two but rather many cities-many conflicting faiths, worldviews, 
lifestyles, cultural and political allegiances. This riotous plural-
ism merely underscores the conclusion suggested above: We 
may aspire to achieve a modus vivendi among these competing 
positions, but it is a mistake to suppose that there can be any en-
compassing theory or "neutral principle" to regulate their inter-
action. 
29. ld. (emphasis added). 
30. ld. 
31. Id. 
32. ld. 
